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Price and Cost Impacts of Concentration
in Food Manufacturing Revisited
Rigoberto A. Lopez and Carmen Lirón-España
This study estimates the elasticities of wholesale food prices, cost efficiency, and
market power with respect to industrial concentration in 35 food processing indus-
tries, modifying the model of Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-España (2002). In contrast
to the results of their earlier analysis, findings of this study indicate that further
increases in concentration would result in significant processing cost savings (and
Lerner index increases) in nearly all industries and that output prices would decline
in nearly 50% of the industries, although significantly so in only 20% of them. As
industrial concentration rises, price declines occur in industries with low levels of
concentration while price increases occur in highly concentrated industries.
Key Words: cost efficiency, food prices, food processing, industrial concentration,
market power
Industrial concentration is often measured by summary indexes of the distribution
of sales by firms in an industry. Two measures published by the federal government
on a comparable basis for a wide range of industries, including those engaged in
food manufacturing, are the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4, the share of sales
of the four largest companies) and the more comprehensive Herfindahl (H) index.
1
By either measure, concentration has significantly increased across food manufac-
turing industries in the last three decades (Rogers, 2001).
2
Increases in industrial concentration occur through mergers, acquisitions, invest-
ments, and other means. In the long run, economies of scale, the extent of product
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1 Formally, the Herfindahl-Hirchman index of industrial concentration is defined by H = ΣjS
2
j, where Sj = qi/Q
[see Martin (2002) for a discussion]. It ranges from 0 for perfect competition (where each firm is an insignificantly
small part of the market) to 1 for a monopolist. Also note that H = (1 + CV
2)/N, where CV
2 is the coefficient of varia-
tion of firms’ shares and N is the number of firms. If all firms are equal, H = 1/N. For a given number of firms, the
greater the variability in firms’ sizes, the greater is H. The main advantage of H over CR4 is that it encompasses all
firms (not just the top four) and also accounts for the size dispersion of firms.
2 Rogers (2001) analyzed food-processing merger waves between 1958 and 1997. In this period, two waves of
horizontal consolidation took place in the food processing industries—the first in the 1980s, and the second that started
in the late 1990s and continues to the present. Rogers further states that in 1997, the top companies in the food
processing sector (out of 16,000 firms) controlled 50% of the value added, which is twice as much as they did in 1967.42   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
3  Other approaches that have analyzed structurally the impact of concentration on industries include Bumpass
(1987); Perry and Porter (1985); and McAfee and Williams (1992). See Whitley (2003) for an excellent review of the
effects of concentration in agricultural markets.
differentiation, and absolute capital requirements for entry are important factors
shaping concentration. While increases in concentration are positively correlated
with market power—a firm’s significant ability to affect price or quantity in the
marketplace—concentration may induce cost efficiency or cost inefficiency or be
cost-neutral. Whether or not cost efficiency effects are able to offset or reinforce
market power effects is crucial to the performance of the food system. Thus, concen-
tration can have an impact not only on consumers (to the extent that these savings
or cost inefficiencies are passed on to them), but also on international competitive-
ness and the profitability of domestic food processing companies.
The importance of the impact of concentration on price is highlighted by the fact
that the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1997)
revised their guidelines to articulate in greater detail how they would treat claims of
efficiencies associated with horizontal mergers. In short, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) often uses a “price” standard to challenge mergers: efficiency should be
large enough to preclude any post-merger price increase (Kattan, 1994; Werden,
1996). When compared across food processing industries, the impacts of increased
concentration on price and cost efficiency can generate useful preliminary infor-
mation in terms of identifying and targeting industries where further increases in
concentration can be harmful to consumers and competition.
Early econometric studies of the so-called structure-conduct-performance (SCP)
relationships, first introduced by Bain (1951), show that there is a positive relation-
ship between U.S. manufacturing industry profits and seller concentration, attributed
to the exercise of market power. However, the efficiency effects of concentration
were largely ignored, particularly those argued by Schumpeter (1949) on the
dynamic relationship between prices and concentration. One of the earlier attempts
to distinguish market power from efficiency effects was contributed by Demsetz
(1973). Sorting out profits by firm size in U.S. manufacturing, Demsetz argues that
the superior efficiency of large share firms is the source of higher profits. Shepherd
(1972) estimates a profitability equation including both market share and the
concentration ratio, finding that the market share effect (efficiency) is positive, like
the concentration effect, but larger and more significant. Peltzman (1977) estimates
separate equations for the concentration-price and the concentration-cost relation-
ships, concluding the cost effects so dominate the positive price effects that the
observed increase in profits with concentration is due to prices falling less than do
costs. Since the 1980s, the concentration-related work has extended along the lines
of the so-called New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) work by motivating
empirical models through formal theoretical models and increasing use of firm-level
data (Martin, 2002).
3
The U.S. food manufacturing industries have been the subject of several empir-
ical works attempting to separate out the market power and efficiency effects ofLopez and Lirón-España Impacts of Concentration in Food Manufacturing   43
4  An impressive number of empirical studies consider only the market power effect of concentration in the food
processing industries in the SCP tradition (e.g., Peterson and Connor, 1995). A few have focused only on the relation-
ship between concentration and efficiency in these industries (Dickson, 1994; Gopinath, Pick, and Li, 2003).
5  This paper addresses only the effects of concentration on output prices and does not consider any effects of con-
centration on input prices, e.g., of raw farm products. For an industry like meatpacking, this issue may be important
and has been analyzed extensively, and some authors do not find evidence of significant monopsony power (e.g.,
Morrison-Paul, 2001). For most industries in the present sample (e.g., malt beverages and bakery products), the
issue of monopsony power is not relevant. In addition, some industries (e.g., poultry processing) are vertically
integrated.
concentration.
4 Gisser (1982, 1999) provides statistical evidence that increased con-
centration is associated with increased total input productivity which is roughly
sufficient to offset oligopoly power-related losses, especially those in the beer
industry. Cotterill and Iton (1993) use a Shepherd-type model (including both
market share and concentration) with Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) data.
They report positive effects for both market share and concentration. Azzam and
Schroeter (1995) and Azzam (1997) use an NEIO-type model in the beef packing
industry, finding that efficiency effects overpower market power effects. Employing
a structural model to decompose the oligopoly power and the cost effects of concen-
tration in 32 food processing industries, Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-España (2002,
henceforth LAL) conclude that concentration induces efficiency only in one-third
of the industries while it results in higher output prices in nearly all industries. In
contrast, Dickson and Sun (2004), like Peltzman (1977), develop separate price-
concentration and cost-concentration equations assuming constant returns to scale;
their findings suggest the overall effect of rising concentration has been to lower
prices, attributing the differences in results to the inability of NEIO models to deal
with technical change, which may underlie concentration itself.
The thrust of this study is to estimate the elasticities of wholesale food prices,
processing cost, and market power with respect to changes in industrial concen-
tration focusing on the role of economies of scale, and to provide alternative results
to those of LAL.
5 While the underlying econometric model draws heavily from the
work of LAL, the following model modifications are made: (a) allowing for
equilibrium output adjustments instead of assuming fixed industry output, and
(b) a double-log, instead of a semi-log, demand form for output. The model is
applied to four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) data from 35 industries
for the 1972S1992 period. As a result, the empirical findings seem to be more
consistent with previous empirical evidence than those of LAL in that there are
efficiency gains associated with concentration increases in most industries. We also
find a higher number of industries where rising concentration produces benign
effects on consumers—i.e., for 49% of the industries (17 out of 35), prices either
decline or price changes are statistically insignificant. Further, our findings indicate
the benign effects of concentration pertain to the low-concentration industries, while
the highly concentrated industries show the most detrimental effects of further
concentration.44   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
Impacts of Concentration
Following LAL, consider an industry with N firms, each producing a homogeneous
output in the amount qi, and Q = Σiqi is total industry output sold at price P. The
output demand function is given by Q = f(P, Z), where Z is a vector of demand
shifters. A firm’s food processing cost is represented by ci(qi, w, t), where w is a
vector of exogenous prices and t is the state of technology.
Each firm is assumed to choose its output level in order to maximize profits (πi):
(1)   πi ' P(Q, z)qi & ci(qi, w, t).
The first-order condition of (1) with respect to qi yields:
(2)   P '
mci(qi, w, t)
1 &
(1 % φ | i)Si
η
,
where is firm i’s conjecture with respect to the reaction of rivals φ | i' MΣ qj/Mqi
(j … i), Si ' qi/Q is the firm’s market share, η ' Mln(Q)/Mln(P) is the price elasticity
of demand in absolute value, and mci(Mci/Mqi) is the firm’s marginal cost.
The food processing cost function for each firm is assumed to take the restricted
generalized Leontief form:















where w is a vector of exogenous input prices; t is a time variable to capture the state
of technology; and γjk, γjt, and βj (j = 1,..., m) are fixed parameters.
Summing marginal costs and conjectural variations across firms in the industry,
using the market shares as weights, one obtains the industry-level empirical ana-
logue of equation (2):
(4) P ' MC
1 & α % (1& α)H
η
,














H is the Herfindahl index (defined in footnote 1), and α is the conjectural variation
or collusion parameter denoting the share-weighted change in the output of rivals in
response to a change in a firm’s output (αi = MΣqj/Mqi), following Clarke and DaviesLopez and Lirón-España Impacts of Concentration in Food Manufacturing   45
6  When α = 0, then L = H/η which is the Cournot outcome, whereas α = 1, L = 1/η is the monopoly outcome.
Perfectly competitive behavior is given by α = !H/(1!H).
7  Recall that quantity is a function of price (via the demand function), and therefore of H via equation (4). Thus,











where L is the Lerner index. Multiplying both sides by H/P gives equation (6),
gP,H ' MC
MC % 2βHηQ
gL,H % gC,H ,
where gL,H and gC,H are as defined in the text.
(1982).
6 Note that the industry-level Lerner index of oligopoly power can be ex-
pressed as L = (α + (1!α)H)/η in the denominator of (4).
Output demand is assumed to take the double logarithmic form:






where d is a price deflator; Zi denotes demand shifters; and δ0, δl, and η denote
parameters.
Market equilibrium in a particular industry is reached when P and Q fulfill
equations (4) and (5) simultaneously. Consequently, the total elasticity of price with
respect to the Herfindahl index (gP,H) can be obtained by:
(6) gP,H ' λ gL,H % gMC,H .
The gP,H price elasticity is the sum of the Lerner index elasticity, / gL,H(' [1& α]PH
MCη), and the marginal cost-efficiency elasticity, mul- gMC,H(' 2QH Σ
m
j βjwj/MC),
tiplied by an equilibrium adjustment factor, .
7 While the Lerner λ (' [1 % ηgC,H]&1)
index elasticity is always positive for these industries, the sign of the marginal cost
elasticity can be positive or negative. The magnitude of the adjustment factor (greater
or less than 1) depends on economies of size. If there are economies of size, the
marginal elasticity is negative and the adjustment factor is greater than 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the industry equilibrium concept. This case shows that an
increase of concentration from H0 to H1 results in a downward shift in the perceived
marginal revenue curve (market power effect) as well as a decrease in marginal cost
(efficiency effect). Market equilibria occur at E0 and E1, respectively. However, the
net effect is an increase in the output price as the market power effect of concen-
tration dominates the efficiency effect. Of course, this case results in an industry
output reduction in order to sustain the price increase.
Data and Empirical Implementation
The sample consists of annual data for the period 1972S1992 for 35 U.S. food manu-
facturing industries at the four-digit (1987) SIC level. The main data source for prices
and quantities of outputs and inputs was Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray’s (1996)46   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
8  The standard caveats apply to the use of Census or Annual Survey of Manufacturers data (MacPhee and Peterson,
1990; Martin, 2002): (a) level of aggregation may not reflect the true extent of markets in certain cases; (b) product
homogeneity is assumed across firms in an industry and over time; and (c) geographic dispositions of firms is such
that the value of shipments and cost are relatively free of distortions due to differences in technology, but depend on
demand differences and factor market conditions. However, by applying a structural model of demand, pricing, and
cost, we avoid the pitfalls of using profitability rates or accounting profits which have plagued structure-conduct-
performance studies (Martin, 2002).
9  By applying Shephard’s lemma to equation (3), one obtains firm-level input demand functions. These can then
be aggregated across firms using market shares as weights to obtain the industry-level demand functions given by:
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online National Bureau of Economic Research database for U.S. manufacturing
industries.
8
The full model of industry equilibrium consists of five equations, with the pricing
equation (4) being of primary interest. The four supplementary equations assist in
identifying the parameters in (4): an output demand equation (5) to help estimate the
demand elasticity and three input demand equations to help estimate the MC
parameters.
9
The endogenous variables are Q, P, and input quantities XK, XL, and XM for capital
services, labor, and materials, respectively. The demand shifters are gross domestic
product as a proxy for consumer income and time as a proxy for consumer prefer-
ences. The price and income values are deflated by the consumer price index (d).
The cost shifters consist of a time variable to capture technological changes, the
Herfindahl index, and input prices for capital services, labor, and materials (wK, wL,
wM) obtained as indexes by dividing expenditures by the respective input quantities.
Figure 1. Price increase with market power and efficiency tradeoffLopez and Lirón-España Impacts of Concentration in Food Manufacturing   47
10  The first step involved the application of the technique presented by Golan, Judge, and Perloff (1996) in which
market shares are forecast by concentration ratio intervals via maximum entropy and then re-forecast for each firm
using a third-degree polynomial function. The estimated H index for 1972 and 1977 was the sum of the squares of
market shares resulting from the polynomial distribution. The second step involved regressing the Census-year H
indexes on a set of instrumental variables (these and the H obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce reports) and
then predicting H for the inter-Census years (Chow and Lin, 1971). These regressions yielded an average R
2 of 85%.
Then the H indexes were estimated with the predicted values. The use of spline functions and exponential smoothing
(using the Curve Expert software) did not significantly alter the results. The H indexes used here are available from
the authors upon request.
Two variables required further assumptions due to the lack of data: the price of
capital and the Herfindahl index. The price of capital was obtained by dividing the
cost of capital services (provided electronically by the Bureau of Labor Statistics)
by the quantity of capital assets for SIC 20 (food manufacturing). Thus, all industries
are assumed to face the same price of capital but, of course, are allowed to have dif-
ferent levels of capital assets. The Herfindahl index was estimated for the inter-
Census years when it was not available.
10
Once the variables were operational, the industry model was applied to the data
from each individual industry using the nonlinear three-stage least squares (3SLS)
estimation procedure with SHAZAM 8.0 software. To allow for industry output
adjustment (unlike LAL, 2002), the equilibrium P and Q before and after a 1%
increase in the Herfindahl index (at mean values) were determined simultaneously
by solving the estimated output demand [equation (4)] and the estimated industry
supply relation [equation (5)] with MATLAB 4.0 software. The elasticities and out-
put adjustments of concentration were computed based on equation (6) for each of
the 35 U.S. food processing industries in the sample.
Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the nonlinear 3SLS estimates of the selected parameters together
with their test statistics for hypothesis testing. In general, the results were plausible
and consistent with theory in terms of expected signs and magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients. We compare the econometric results of key market parameters to LAL (2002)
as well as to Bhuyan and Lopez (1997, henceforth BL). Even though the latter did
not include industrial concentration in their model, they provide industry-specific
estimates for demand elasticities, the Lerner index, and economies of size.
Using the Wald χ
2 statistic, the null hypothesis of no oligopoly power (H0: L = 0)
was rejected in all but two industries (94%) at the 5% level of significance, consist-
ent with the findings of BL. Furthermore, approximately 86% (30 industries) exhibit
economies of size (c.f., 57% of the 36 food industries reported by BL and 45% of
the 29 industries reported by LAL). The average estimated price elasticity of demand
and Lerner indexes (approximately !0.49 and 0.27, respectively) are close to those
of BL (approximately !0.52 and 0.33). The average implied economies of size
reported by BL for the food processing industries (approximately 0.84) is lower than
for those shown in table 1 (approximately 0.92).48   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 1. Selected Parameter Estimates, U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries,
1972S S S S1992
Elasticity of Demand
SIC Industry η t-Statistic
2011 Meat Packing Plants !0.415* !5.45
2013 Sausages and Other Prepared Meats !0.277* !2.39
2015 Poultry and Egg Processing !0.653* !4.27
2021 Creamery Butter !0.652* !4.75
2022 Cheese, Natural and Processed !0.464* !5.05
2023 Condensed and Evaporated Milk !0.334* !3.24
2024 Ice Cream and Frozen Desserts !0.525* !2.18
2026 Fluid Milk !0.561* !3.18
2032 Canned Specialties !0.495* !7.25
2033 Canned Fruits and Vegetables !0.108* !2.38
2034 Dehydrated Fruits, Vegetables, and Soups !0.293* !2.19
2035 Pickles, Sauces, and Salad Dressings !1.061* !3.08
2037 Frozen Fruits and Vegetables !0.070* !5.99
2041 Flour and Other Grain Mill Products !0.162* !4.03
2045 Blended and Prepared Flour !0.675* !5.17
2046 Wet Corn Milling !0.330 !0.91
2047 Dog and Cat Food !0.600* !5.02
2048 Prepared Feeds (NEC) !0.154* !2.76
2061 Raw Cane Sugar !0.321* !6.02
2062 Cane Sugar Refining !0.479* !6.28
2063 Beet Sugar !0.443* !7.52
2064 Candy, Other Confectionery Products & Chewing Gum !0.467* !6.10
2066 Chocolate and Cocoa Products !0.484* !9.56
2077 Animal and Marine Fats and Oil !0.316 !0.92
2079 Shortening and Cooking Oils !0.228* !6.85
2082 Malt Beverages !0.970* !4.01
2084 Wines, Brandy, and Brandy Spirits !0.621* !4.27
2085 Distilled Liquor, Except Brandy !1.675* !7.01
2086 Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks !0.270* !5.84
2087 Flavoring Extracts and Syrups (NEC) !0.719* !7.84
2091 Canned and Cured Seafood !0.552* !3.27
2092 Fresh or Frozen Seafood !0.010* !4.99
2095 Roasted Coffee !0.305* !6.91
2097 Manufactured Ice !0.888* !4.10
2099 Food Preparations (NEC) !0.530* !5.64
Average: !0.4888
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 1% level. The term η stands for elasticity of demand; α denotes
the conjectural variation; L and gC,Q represent the Lerner index and cost elasticity with respect to output, defined as
industry marginal cost (MC) divided by industry average cost, respectively. The superscripts “a” and “b” denote
significance at the 1% level under Cournot and perfect competition hypotheses, respectively. NEC denotes “not
elsewhere classified.”Lopez and Lirón-España Impacts of Concentration in Food Manufacturing   49
Table 1. Extended
Conjectural Variation Lerner Index  Economies of Size
SIC α tc tpc L χ
2  gC,Q   χ
2
2011 0.009
 ab 1.74 8.72 0.108* 51.17 0.935* 19.60
2013 0.027
 ab 1.65 2.75 0.156* 125.74 0.983 1.59
2015 0.045
 ab 2.87 4.61 0.106* 155.02 0.995 1.20
2021 0.006
 b 0.13 2.00 0.113* 5.13 0.881* 6.31
2022 0.010
 b 1.00 6.73 0.130* 130.32 0.977* 5.03
2023 0.045
 ab 1.78 3.77 0.273* 123.13 0.956 2.74
2024 0.088
 ab 1.71 2.24 0.214* 108.70 0.930* 9.19
2026 0.101
 ab 2.75 3.19 0.205* 78.95 0.913* 11.16
2032 0.015
 b 0.86 12.01   0.351* 206.26 0.904* 8.11
2033 0.012
 b 0.98 3.00 0.331* 33.59 0.846* 4.95
2034 0.007
 b 0.23 2.37 0.205* 36.30 1.043 0.95
2035 0.277
 ab 2.47 3.37 0.322* 218.16 0.953* 10.25
2037 !0.008
 ab !2.44 7.39 0.335* 74.97 0.854* 316.15
2041 0.003
 b 0.23 5.40 0.388* 102.23 0.688* 80.34
2045 0.243
 ab 3.79 5.28 0.456* 705.41 0.740* 110.47
2046 !0.131 !0.92 0.46 0.164 0.34 0.972 0.02
2047 0.109
 ab 2.42 5.66 0.369* 227.15 0.980 0.37
2048 0.011
 b 1.21 3.31 0.181* 92.52 0.921* 14.97
2061 0.038
 ab 1.90 6.15 0.346* 58.71 0.757* 29.16
2062 !0.132
 a !1.98 1.16 0.128 1.25 0.886 0.86
2063 0.015
 b 0.54 6.78 0.357* 112.89 0.709* 58.84
2064 0.114
 ab 4.64 7.13 0.353* 305.71 0.969 1.42
2066 !0.074
 ab !1.94 4.94 0.308* 24.06 0.956 0.29
2077 0.033 0.27 0.62 0.227 0.54 1.004 0.01
2079 0.012
 b 1.02 6.65 0.315* 181.83 0.798* 64.67
2082 !0.047
 b !1.30 5.15 0.153* 30.65 1.030 0.81
2084 0.103
 ab 2.81 5.32 0.285* 244.41 0.955* 5.13
2085 0.570
 ab 5.38 6.24 0.362* 141.54 1.041 0.72
2086 0.065
 ab 5.14 7.00 0.320* 880.77 0.900* 63.68
2087 0.179
 ab 4.51 9.45 0.434* 269.34 1.220* 15.66
2091 0.005
 b 0.19 4.00 0.153* 22.79 0.974 2.49
2092 0.010
 ab 2.22 5.55 0.261* 137.64 0.886* 20.17
2095 0.089
 b 0.36 7.70 0.528* 115.15 0.624* 51.99
2097 0.227
 ab 3.75 4.05 0.272* 199.36 0.978 1.56
2099 0.174
 ab 5.06 5.82 0.365* 879.73 0.931* 32.42
Average: 0.0876 0.2735 0.916850   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 2. Concentration Related Elasticities, U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries,
1972S S S S1992
Price Elasticity
SIC Industry Rank gP,H χ
2
2011 Meat Packing Plants 23 !0.048* 4.78
2013 Sausages and Other Prepared Meats 16 0.035 2.20
2015 Poultry and Egg Processing 17 0.031* 7.70
2021 Creamery Butter 31 !0.320 1.20
2022 Cheese, Natural and Processed 14 0.079* 25.00
2023 Condensed and Evaporated Milk 12 0.101* 4.95
2024 Ice Cream and Frozen Desserts 26 !0.100 2.50
2026 Fluid Milk 29 !0.181* 5.60
2032 Canned Specialties   5 0.314* 59.93
2033 Canned Fruits and Vegetables 22 !0.039 0.13
2034 Dehydrated Fruits, Vegetables, and Soups   6 0.306* 8.46
2035 Pickles, Sauces, and Salad Dressings 19 !0.010 0.66
2037 Frozen Fruits and Vegetables   4 0.340* 12.71
2041 Flour and Other Grain Mill Products 32 !0.360* 9.44
2045 Blended and Prepared Flour 35 !1.001* 9.23
2046 Wet Corn Milling   1 0.620 0.50
2047 Dog and Cat Food   8 0.264* 15.24
2048 Prepared Feeds (NEC) 21 !0.034 0.85
2061 Raw Cane Sugar 33 !0.368* 4.42
2062 Cane Sugar Refining   9 0.232 0.88
2063 Beet Sugar 34 !0.506 3.15
2064 Candy, Other Confectionery Products & Chewing Gum 11 0.107* 6.81
2066 Chocolate and Cocoa Products   2 0.600* 27.85
2077 Animal and Marine Fats and Oil 18 0.017 0.21
2079 Shortening and Cooking Oils 28 !0.140 2.15
2082 Malt Beverages   7 0.275* 32.03
2084 Wines, Brandy, and Brandy Spirits 15 0.078* 10.87
2085 Distilled Liquor, Except Brandy 13 0.100 2.11
2086 Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks 27 !0.117* 73.08
2087 Flavoring Extracts and Syrups (NEC)   3 0.544* 108.96
2091 Canned and Cured Seafood 10 0.120* 18.40
2092 Fresh or Frozen Seafood 24 !0.050 0.66
2095 Roasted Coffee 30 !0.245 1.64
2097 Manufactured Ice 20 !0.026 0.40
2099 Food Preparations (NEC) 25 !0.096* 10.57
Summary Averages:
   Low Concentration 20      !0.050 ( ¯ H <0 . 1 ) ,n ' 27
   Medium Concentration 13.5      0.165 (0.1< ¯ H < 0.18), n ' 6
   High Concentration 4.5      0.438 ( ¯ H > 0.18), n ' 2
   All Industries, n '35 18      0.015
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 1% level. The ranking of industries is based on the price elasticities of
concentration from the highest (most positive = 1) to the lowest (most negative = 35); gP,H is the price elasticity of
concentration; gL,H is the elasticity of market power; gC,H is the efficiency elasticity; and λ is the price-quantity adjustment.
NEC denotes “not elsewhere classified.”Lopez and Lirón-España Impacts of Concentration in Food Manufacturing   51
Table 2.  Extended








2011 0.095* 24.75 !0.140* 17.16 1.07 0.036
2013 0.071* 5.01 !0.037 1.53 1.02 0.017
2015 0.043* 15.69 !0.012 1.19 1.01 0.026
2021 0.008* 20.00 !0.271* 4.89 1.22 0.068
2022 0.126* 21.55 !0.049* 4.79 1.03 0.051
2023 0.190* 7.95 !0.093 2.50 1.04 0.048
2024 0.060 3.70 !0.152* 7.94 1.09 0.027
2026 0.032* 7.75 !0.192* 9.35 1.13 0.016
2032 0.494* 28.43 !0.214* 6.64 1.12 0.160
2033 0.329* 4.09 !0.366 3.54 1.05 0.024
2034 0.231* 3.92 0.082 1.03 0.98 0.054
2035 0.091* 4.16 !0.100* 9.28 1.12 0.090
2037 0.674* 23.03 !0.344* 6.81 1.03 0.031
2041 0.605* 10.73 !0.910* 38.00 1.18 0.060
2045 0.180* 12.38 !0.704* 62.76 1.91 0.090
2046 0.668 0.72 !0.060 0.02 1.02 0.163
2047 0.298* 14.06 !0.042 0.35 1.03 0.124
2048 0.139* 6.74 !0.172* 12.68 1.03 0.018
2061 0.351* 22.44 !0.643* 16.44 1.26 0.076
2062 0.462* 24.72 !0.260 0.68 1.15 0.057
2063 0.503* 35.47 !0.823* 29.73 1.58 0.145
2064 0.169* 23.18 !0.066 1.33 1.04 0.057
2066 0.665* 47.60 !0.094 0.27 1.05 0.207
2077 0.159 0.58 0.008 0.01 0.10 0.040
2079 0.384* 36.64 !0.507* 41.20 1.14 0.060
2082 0.236* 11.63 0.050 0.85 0.96 0.185
2084 0.168* 11.71 !0.095* 4.67 1.07 0.083
2085 0.034* 7.46 0.078 0.78 0.89 0.083
2086 0.116* 25.58 !0.225* 51.47 1.07 0.022
2087 0.328* 25.89 0.355* 23.05 0.80 0.162
2091 0.171* 8.69 !0.056 2.34 1.04 0.091
2092 0.209* 20.93 !0.258* 15.79 1.03 0.014
2095 1.056* 20.50 !1.210* 19.03 1.59 0.153
2097 0.022* 9.66 !0.047 1.49 1.05 0.018
2099 0.063* 20.03 !0.151* 28.02 1.09 0.025
Summary Averages:
Low Concentration 0.192 !0.210 1.068 0.047
Med. Concentration 0.558 !0.332 1.190 0.151
High Concentration 0.451 !0.220 1.005 0.196
All Industries 0.269 !0.221 1.081 0.07752   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
11  The FTC will not challenge mergers in unconcentrated markets, where the post-merger H is below 0.10 (or 1.000
based on a maximum H of 10,000). In moderately concentrated markets, where the post-merger H is between 0.10 and
0.18, the agency will challenge mergers that have increased H by more than 0.01 (or 100 points based on 10,000). In
highly concentrated markets, where post-merger H is above 0.18 and the merger increases H by more than 0.05, the
agency will require further study. Also, note that the definition of a “market” is usually more detailed than the one
considered in this study.
Table 2 presents the computed elasticities of price with respect to the Herfindahl
index (gP,H) as well as their components: market power elasticities (gL,H), efficiency
elasticities (gMC,H), and quantity adjustment factors (λ). The average price elasticity
with respect to concentration was positive and estimated at 0.070, indicating that,
on average, greater concentration leads to a modest increase in output price. How-
ever, concentration leads to price declines in nearly 49% of the industries (17 of the
35 industries), in contrast to the findings of LAL, who observed price decreases in
only 16% of the cases (5 of 32). Price-concentration elasticities range from !1.001
for blended and prepared flour (SIC 2045) to 0.600 for chocolate and cocoa products
(SIC 2066).
The statistical tests to determine whether or not increases in concentration signifi-
cantly affect price, while taking into account market power and efficiency effects,
consisted of the following hypothesis testing using the Wald χ
2 statistic: H0: gP,H = 0
versus H1: gP,H … 0. The null hypothesis of no price effect was rejected in 20 indus-
tries (57%) at the 5% level of significance. Thus, concentration significantly affects
output price in a majority of the industries. Furthermore, concentration would
significantly decrease output price in seven industries (H1: gP,H < 0), or 20% of the
industries studied. On the other hand, further concentration would result in a signifi-
cant price increase (H1: gP,H > 0) in 37% of the industries analyzed. In 15 industries
(43%), the net effect on price is not statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 2 also shows that most U.S. food processing industries (27 of 35, or 77%)
are in the “low concentration” category according to FTC (1997) guidelines. A
smaller group (six, or 17%) is in the “moderate concentration” group. In fact, only
two industries (SIC 2066, chocolate and cocoa products, and SIC 2082, malt bever-
ages) are in the “high concentration” category at the four-digit SIC level.
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Note that for the “low concentration” industries, on average, concentration is
benign to consumers as it generally decreases price while generating efficiencies.
The “medium concentration” group produces medium increases in prices with
stronger market power and efficiency effects than the “low concentration” group.
The “high concentration” group (although only two food manufacturing industries
fall in this category) produces the highest price increases relative to increases in
concentration. These findings support the FTC guideline recommendations in not
challenging mergers in low concentration markets but challenging those in the other
two groups.
The average Lerner index elasticity for the entire sample was 0.269 (table 2). The
elasticity ranged from 0.008 for creamery butter (SIC 2021) to 1.056 for roasted
coffee (SIC 2095). The statistical tests to determine whether or not increases in con-
centration will increase price by enhancing market power consisted of the followingLopez and Lirón-España Impacts of Concentration in Food Manufacturing   53
hypothesis testing using the Wald χ
2 statistic: H0: gL,H = 0 versus H1: gL,H > 0. The
null hypothesis of no market power effect of concentration was rejected in 32 indus-
tries (94%) at the 5% level of significance. This result is not surprising, and confirms
the traditional wisdom that greater concentration leads to higher prices, as found in
market power studies.
The average marginal cost elasticity of concentration for the entire sample was
estimated at !0.221. The elasticity ranged from !1.210 for roasted coffee (SIC 2095)
to 0.355 for flavoring extracts and syrups (SIC 2087). The statistical tests to deter-
mine whether or not increases in concentration affect price via changes in marginal
cost consisted of the following hypothesis testing, again using the Wald χ
2 statistic:
H0: gC,H = 0 versus H1: gC,H … 0. The null hypothesis of no efficiency effect generally
was rejected in 19 industries (54%) at the 5% level of significance. As confirmed by
this result, concentration leads to efficiency effects in the U.S. food manufacturing
industries. Given that concentration also leads to a significant market power effect
in nearly 75% of the industries, the crucial question is which effect predominates.
Computed adjustment values were in accordance with cost elasticity or efficiency
elasticity estimates—i.e., adjustments are greater than one for those industries with
negative efficiency elasticity and lower than one for those with positive efficiency
elasticity. The average factor adjustment value for the entire sample is slightly greater
than one (1.081), ranging from 0.80 for flavoring extracts and syrups (SIC 2087) to
1.58 for beet sugar production (SIC 2063), indicating that output generally expands
with concentration.
Concluding Remarks
U.S. food processing industries are increasingly becoming concentrated, raising
questions as to the effects on market power, cost efficiency, and wholesale food
prices. This study has analyzed the impact of concentration on output prices via
concentration elasticities based on an econometric model of industry equilibrium
applied to 35 food processing industries.
Empirical results show that, in most cases, increases in industrial concentration
lead to cost efficiency due to widespread economies of size in the food processing
industries. At the same time, they also lead to increases in market power. On balance,
in nearly 50% of the industries, increases in concentration ultimately result in lower
processed food product prices, although such a benign effect of concentration is
statistically significant in only 20% of the industries analyzed. In 43% of the indus-
tries, the impact of concentration on output prices is not statistically discernable.
However, in 37% of the industries, the effect of concentration on prices is positive
and statistically significant, as conventionally expected. Overall, these results show
a much more benign effect of concentration on wholesale food prices than those
reported by Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-España (2002), and the results are more con-
sistent with the efficiency effects of concentration found in previous studies.
The results also reveal that, on average, increases in industrial concentration in
low concentration markets lead to price declines. Fortunately, this is the case in over54   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
two-thirds of the industries analyzed. Quite the opposite is true for highly concen-
trated industries, where further increases in concentration lead to increases in prices.
Thus, the results lend support to the Federal Trade Commission guidelines in terms
of challenging mergers in moderately and highly concentrated markets. These levels
of concentration, however, exist only in a handful of the food processing industries,
such as wet corn milling, chocolate and cocoa products, and malt beverages.
Extending the current research through models that explicitly consider product
differentiation, product variety, or through use of firm- or brand-specific data in
more refined market definitions could prove a fruitful area of further inquiry, given
the nature of processed food products. Another interesting avenue of research is the
simultaneous consideration of technological change or innovation and concentration,
invoking the dynamic effects of concentration advocated by Schumpeter more than
50 years ago. This may be accomplished by extending the current model so that
concentration interacts with technological change, or through an additional equation
explaining concentration in terms of productivity or technological change.
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